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Abstract
This paper estimates an augmented gravity model incorporating different
aspects of Trade Facilitation in developed and developing countries. Trade Fa-
cilitation is defined as measures that aim at making international trade easier
by eliminating administrative delays, simplifying commercial procedures, in-
creasing transparency, security and the place of new technologies in trade.
This paper provides new theoretical and empirical enhancements. On the one
hand, the model is based on theoretical foundations related to monopolistic
competition and border effects. The originality of this paper is that Trade
Facilitation facets are included in the model. On the other hand, the em-
pirical achievement of the paper is that it uses different databases allowing
us to take into account many features of Trade Facilitation. I use several
databases coming from different sources: Doing business (World Bank) and
Institutional Profiles (CEPII). My main findings show that transaction time
for imports and number of documents for exports have a negative impact on
trade. Our sample is split into sub-samples in order to take into account the
impact of development level. It turns out that Trade Facilitation aspects have
not the same impact on developed and developing countries. Finally, we con-
clude that some perishable (food and beverages), seasonal (wearing apparels)
and high-value added products are more sensitive to import time than other
products. Hard industries are rather sensitive to export documents.
JEL classification: F10, F12, F15
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1 Introduction
“Making International Trade EASIER” is the most straight forward defini-
tion of Trade Facilitation. However, the term Trade Facilitation encompasses various
important aspects such as: simplification of commercial procedures; harmonization
of commercial rules; transparent information and procedures; the recourse to new
technologies allowing trade promotion and more secured means of payment (more
reliable, quicker, which will accelerate the delivery of exchanged goods). For the
World Customs Organization, Trade Facilitation means: the avoidance of unneces-
sary trade restrictiveness. This can be achieved by applying modern techniques and
technologies, while improving the quality of controls in an internationally harmonized
manner.. Therefore, it is noteworthy that Trade Facilitation does not take into ac-
count traditional barriers: neither tariffs, nor non-tariff barriers. It incorporates new
transaction costs, institutional costs, administrative delays, etc. In summary, these
barriers can be called “Non-official barriers” because they are not classified in an
official framework between governments and organizations. They are also non tariff
ones because they do not incorporate any tariff barriers.
Two group of reasons explain the importance of taking into account Trade Fa-
cilitation in gravity models, starting with economic ones. After reducing tariff and
non-tariff barriers, trade partners have discovered that there exists other impedi-
ments to trade (OECD, 2002a). Reduction of such non-official non-tariff barriers is
likely to have more impact on trade than the reduction of classical ones. Moreover,
the increased commercial regimes complexity, often referred as a “Spaghetti Bowl”,
the increased supply chains interdependency as well as the imported products deliv-
ery delays have turned into a severe constraint on production. On the other side, the
cost of non-facilitation is very high. Non-official barriers account for 2 to 15% of the
exchanged goods value. A number of previous papers have evidenced the importance
of non-visible barriers. Cernat (2001) supports the idea that the key to the African
trade enigma lies in Trade Facilitation. Finally, as Trade Facilitation measures may
be largely resource wasting and redundant, the welfare coming from their elimina-
tion is greater the more the restrictions being addressed waste real resources rather
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than generate rents that are captured by interest groups (quota rents) or government
(tariff revenues). Hence, if there is neither rents nor revenue for a country to lose by
removing restriction, which is the case in Trade Facilitation aspects, benefits would
be greater from eliminating them than if the measures create rents.
These economic reasons explain why a majority of countries that are part of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) have launched Trade Facilitation initiatives. In
November 2001, during Doha Development Round, many issues have been negotiated
such as improving market access for developing countries, Singapore issues, liberal-
ization of environmental goods and services and the access of developing countries
to medicines. That is why Trade Facilitation being one of the Singapore issues was
included in the cycle agenda. Specifically, they focused on the following aspects:
simplifying trade procedures, promoting technical assistance and taking into con-
sideration the limited capacities of developing countries. Hence, Doha Ministerial
Declaration recognizes the importance of “further acceleration of expedition, delivery
and clearance of goods, including goods in transit, and the need for technical assis-
tance and an increased capacity-building in this area”(WTO, 2001). Furthermore,
at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, ministers agreed that “negotiations
will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of
a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that session on modalities for ne-
gotiations”(OECD, 2003a). In Hong Kong, there was not a real success regarding
Trade Facilitation process. This is due to the fact that developing countries are
not ready to adopt a legal drafting on the substantive provisions of the agreement
before more progress is made regarding technical assistance and capacity building.
These successive meetings show to what extent Trade Facilitation represents a quite
important and debatable issue on the WTO agenda.
To assess the impact of Trade Facilitation on bilateral trade, I use a gravity
model. The latter has become an essential tool for measuring the impact of tariff
and non-tariff barriers on services and goods commercial flows. Regarding the liter-
ature on Trade Facilitation measures, it has had so far two shortcomings: studies are
either descriptive such as the ones undertook by the Organization of Economic Coop-
3
eration and Development, or they exhibit a strong legal orientation (OECD, 2002c,
2002d, 2003a and 2003b et WTO, 2002). Besides, Empirical literature on Trade Fa-
cilitation could be classified in three main groups. The first one includes studies that
emerged in the wake of Mc Callum’s work (1995) where models were used to quantify
border effects. This literature has been improved theoretically by Bergstrand (1989
and 1990) and Bayer and Bergstrand (1999), Head and Mayer (2001a and 2001b),
Feenstra (2002), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Fontagne´ et al (2004 and
2005) who added a term called “BRC”which is the “Border Related Costs” and that
takes into account tariff and non-tariff barriers (quantitative restriction, administra-
tive barriers, technical barriers and sanitary and phytosanitary measures). All these
improvements have enforced the theoretical base of gravity models narrowing the
gap between theoretical and empirical findings as they became increasingly used in
empirical studies. The second group is characterized by models treating only one
aspect of Trade Facilitation, which are referred in this paper as “Mono-dimensional
models”. For instance, Freund and Weinhold (2000) examine the impact of internet
on trade, Hummels (2001) and Djankov et al (2008) investigate the effect of time
on trade, Limao and Venables (2000) analyze the effect of efficient infrastructure
on bilateral trade and last but not least, Dutt and Traca (2007) study the effect of
corruption. The last group of empirical studies of Trade Facilitation gathers mod-
els incorporating several aspects of Trade Facilitation, named “Multi-dimensional
models”. Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2003, 2004) pioneered this kind of studies by
quantifying the impact of Trade Facilitation measures through a gravity model by
adding ports efficiency, e-business intensity, regulatory and customs environments.
They first applied this model on APEC countries, then extended the model to a
larger sample of countries. Hence, it could be deduced that these empirical studies
suffer from three major problems: some studies neglect the aspects of barriers di-
rectly or explicitly related to Trade Facilitation, and such an omission leads to an
overestimation of the impact of classical barriers, like the studies included in the
border effect category. Moreover, models used have poor theoretical foundations
(such as the studies of the third group, namely “Multi-dimensional models”). This
has two important implications. First, estimation results are biased due to omit-
ted variables. Second, it turns out that the coefficients interpretation is relatively
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difficult. For instance, regarding Trade Facilitation aspects, their impact can be de-
composed in two parts: the impact of Trade Facilitation itself and the impact of the
elasticity of substitution. If this point is not taken into account, the effect of Trade
Facilitation aspects will be underestimated. On the other hand, these studies have
neglected some aspects of Trade Facilitation (such as the studies of the second cate-
gory, i.e. “Mono-dimensional models”). Thus, the coefficients of the measures taken
into consideration might be misleading in the sense they reflect not only their effect,
but also the effect of other aspects. Therefore, it is important to study the impact
of numerous Trade Facilitation measures to have consistent coefficients of each one
of them. The innovation of the model developed in this paper, with respect to the
works mentioned above, is that it introduces in the gravity model Trade Facilitation
in an explicit way.
Hence, this paper provides new theoretical and empirical enhancements. First of
all, I use a gravity model based on theoretical foundations related to monopolistic
competition and border effects. The originality of this paper is that it also includes
Trade Facilitation facets in a theocratical. Secondly, a crucial aspect of our analysis
is that it studies the impact of Trade Facilitation aspects on the sectoral level in
order to assess which products are more sensitive than others. To do so, I shed the
light on three important aspects of Trade Facilitation: time (measuring transaction
length), documents (capturing the impact of bureaucracy) and internet (as a proxy
for technological intensity). In addition, the empirical achievement of the paper is
that it uses different databases allowing us to check for the robustness of the model
and to study more features of Trade Facilitation. I use databases coming from dif-
ferent sources: Doing business (World Bank) and Institutional Profiles (CEPII).
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 is devoted to data analysis as well as
some stylized facts of Trade Facilitation. Section 3 develops theoretical foundations
of the model used. Section 4 exposes the econometric specification of the model.
Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 is devoted to robustness check and section
7 concludes.
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2 Descriptive statistics and Some Stylized Facts
The sample used includes 175 countries. Following the World Bank classifica-
tion, 28% of the sample are low-income countries, 50% are lower- and upper-middle
income ones and finally 22% are high-income ones distributed between OECD and
non-OECD countries. The differences in countries incomes allow us to take into
account the state of Trade Facilitation in developing as well as developed countries1.
The Doing Business database developed by the World Bank is used. It contains
several sections, the largest being “Trading Across Borders”. It brings together
seven indicators related to procedures incorporated in trade. These indicators are:
number of days of exports and imports, number of documents required for exports
and imports, the cost of imports and exports and ease of doing business. Only the
time and document aspects are taken into account 2. Figure 1 shows the relationship
between number of document to be filed and transaction time for exports and imports
in selected countries of the sample. Thus, a country with an important bureaucracy
involving many documents, has a long delay to export or to import. For instance,
in Zimbabwe an exporter needs to file 9 documents in order to go ahead with his
transaction while an importer needs to file 15 of them. The time to export is about
42 days and 66 days to import. In contrast, all these aspects are much lower in Hong
Kong. Hence, Trade Facilitation aspects are correlated among them. Moreover, such
customs procedures may also be duplicative as paperwork and data requirements
have already been required by local authorities in the home country. That is why
it is very important to take into account such aspects for the exporter and for the
importer simultaneously not only one of them.
[Figure 1 about here]
Table 2 exhibits the correlation among time and document variables. Time for
export and for import are highly correlated (0.94), while correlation for import
and export documents is equal to 0.7. Other cross correlations are on average 0.6.
Therefore, since time and document across countries are correlated, the exclusion of
1For countries list, see table 5 and 6 in appendix 3
2For descriptive statistics among these variables, see table 1 in appendix 2.
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document in the regressions may cause time variation across countries to reflect both
time and documents inefficiencies channel of influence. Hence, an omitted variables
bias may be present. The addition of the documents in regression is intended to
distinguish between bureaucracy and the length impact on trade.
[Table 2 about here]
Table 3 exhibits the average number of days and number of documents for devel-
oped and developing countries. Regarding number of documents, the gap between
them is not very significant, except for the the importer’s documents for export and
import. Nonetheless, there is a pronounced difference between developed and devel-
oping economies on the time level, especially for the importer time for export and
for import.
[Table 3 about here]
Finally, the fact of being landlocked increase transaction costs. A large part of
this cost may be explained by Trade Facilitation aspects. Table 4 shows evidence of
the differences between landlocked countries and not landlocked ones. The average
time for export of the former is 36 days and of the latter 22 days. It is even worse
for imports time as it is 44 days and 26 days respectively. The same analysis applies
to number of documents, but to a less extent as shown in table 6.
[Table 4 about here]
After presenting to what extent developed and developing countries are het-
erogenous with respect to Trade Facilitation aspects, it is obvious that studying
their impact on trade between these countries is quite relevant.
3 Theoretical Foundations of the Model
This paper uses the model that has been initially developed by Fujita et al.
(1999) and Head and Mayer (2001a). The model is extended by taking into account
Trade Facilitation aspects in its derivation. The authors develop a gravity model
from a monopolistic competition model that has been slightly modified by Fontagne´
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et al (2005) by introducing a term called“Border Related Costs”. This term includes
all tariff and non-tariff barriers. The originality of this paper is that it disaggregates
this term into several parts. The first part is related to tariff barriers, the second
one is dedicated to the preferential trade agreements impact and finally a term in-
corporating explicitly the Trade Facilitation aspects.
The theoretical foundation of the gravity model is the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman
model of trade under monopolistic competition. The main assumptions of the mo-
nopolistic competition model used in this paper are as follows :
- The representative consumer maximizes a Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) utility function,
- A production function are characterized by increasing returns to scale,
- Firms have identical technology,
- Commercial transactions costs are: transport cost measured by distance, tariffs
cost, non-tariff barriers which is composed of the presence of a Preferential Trade
Agreement (PTA) between two countries and the Trade Facilitation aspects taken
into consideration.
The problem of maximization is given by:
maxUi = [
N∑
j=1
nj∑
h=1
aijcijh]
σ−1
σ
σ
σ−1
(1)
s.c.yi =
∑
i
nj∑
h=1
pijcijh (2)
mij = cijpij
pij = pjτij
mi =
∑
k
mik
where: aij: bilateral preference term
cijh: consumption of variety h by the consumer i coming from each country j.
σ: substitution elasticity,
pj: plant price of country j,
mij: CIF value of imports of country i coming from country j,
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mi: expenditure on all goods coming from all countries including the home country.
τij: transaction costs between countries i and j.
By resolving the maximization problem in (1) subject to the constraint in (2),
we have:
mij =
aσ−1ij njp
1−σ
ij∑
k a
σ−1
ik nkp
1−σ
ik
mi (3)
mii =
aσ−1ii nip
1−σ
ii∑
k a
σ−1
ik nkp
1−σ
ik
mi (4)
Dividing these two equations then disaggregating the price term into two parts,
i.e. plant price and transaction costs, we obtain:
mij
mii
= (
aij
aii
)σ−1
nj
ni
(
pj
pi
)1−σ(
τij
τii
)σ−1 (5)
where: mij
mii
: relative imports.
For the firm j:
lj = F + γqj (6)
pij = pjqj − wjlj (7)
where:
lj: labor in firm j,
F: fixed labor cost,
γ: the inverse of firms productivity,
qj: firm j production,
pij: firm j profits,
wj: wage in firm j.
Replacing equation (6) in equation (7), we have the profits equation. Through
the pricing equation and the free-entry condition, the representative firm output
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equilibrium is given by the following equation:
qj =
F (σ − 1)
γ
(8)
with identical technologies,
qj = q∀j = 1, ....N (9)
Hence, the production value is calculated as follows:
νj = qpjnj (10)
νi = qpini (11)
where νj: value of production of industry j.
Dividing (10) by (11) and rearranging, we obtain:
nj
ni
=
νjpi
νipj
(12)
Regarding transaction costs:
τij = d
δ
ij(1 + brcij) (13)
where:
dij: bilateral distance between the two countries i and j (which proxies for transport
cost).
brcij border related costs between the two countries i and j.
The term brc equals to:
(1 + brcij) = (1 + tij)(exp(ηEij + θPTAij
+ζContiij + µ1TFi + µ2TFj)) (14)
where:
tij: ad valorem bilateral tariff.
PTAij: a dummy variable = 1 if i and j belong to the same preferential integration
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agreement (PTA).
Contiij: a dummy variable equals to 1 if the two countries are contiguous.
Eij: intercept.
TFi and TFj: indicators related to trade facilitation aspects faced by the importer
and the exporter respectively. As mentioned earlier, Trade Facilitation measures
take several forms. For instance, from Doing Business, time and document for ex-
port and for import are taken into account. Regarding Institutional Profiles, all its
Trade Facilitation aspects are used for robustness check.
As to preferences:
aij = exp(eij − (β − λLij)(Eij + PTAij)) (15)
where:
eij: the random part of preferences.
β: the systematic part of preferences or the home bias.
Lij: dummy variable = 1 if i and j share the same language. If Lij changes from 0
to 1, the home bias changes from β to β − λ
4 Econometric Specification of the Model
Combining the natural logarithm of equation (5) with the elements developed
above will result in the following equation:
ln(
mij
mii
) = (σ − 1) ln(aij
aii
) + ln(
nj
ni
)
+(1− σ)ln(pj
pi
) + (σ − 1) ln(τij
τii
) (16)
By replacing the preferences and transaction costs obtained from(14) and (15)
in (16) then simplifying the following terms: Lii = 0, Eii = 0, PTAii = 0; tii = 0;
Eij + PTAij = 1; Contiii = 0, removing the repeated terms of the importer which
are µ1TFi and multiplying (σ − 1) by the terms in brackets yields the following
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estimable model:
ln(
mij
mii
) = ln(
νj
νi
)− σ ln(pj
pi
) + δ(σ − 1) ln(dij
dii
)
−(σ − 1) ln(1 + tij) + (σ − 1)λLij + (σ − 1)(θ − β)PTAij
+(σ − 1)ζContiij + (σ − 1)(η − β)Eij + (σ − 1)µ2(TFi + TFj)
+ij (17)
where: (σ−1)(η−β): the border effects which are not related to a PTA membership,
(σ − 1)(θ − β): supplementary trade due to a PTA membership,
(σ − 1)µ2: variation in trade due to Trade Facilitation aspects.
ij: the error term equals to (σ − 1)(eij − eii).
Regarding the Trade Facilitation aspects, it is supposed that the aspects
related to customs inefficiencies should have a negative effect on trade. By disaggre-
gating them, we should also have a negative effect of the number of days of exports
and imports, of the number of documents needed for exports and imports. All these
items discourage trade as they increase exports and imports delays which may cause
many losses (imported or exported products may perish, tastes may change, etc.).
Two more aspects have an important effect on bilateral trade: the fact of being
landlocked and being an island. The former reduces trade due to many transit costs
generating time waste and additional costs and the latter increases it thanks to mar-
itime facilities and the presence of many ports. However, the fact of being landlocked
may be overcame if landlocked countries improve their Trade Facilitation aspects,
especially through infrastructure improvements. Similarly, being an island does not
guarantee higher level of trade without good infrastructure and efficient ports to
handle exported and imported goods. Internet widespread boosts trade. Finally,
infrastructure is supposed to increase trade because it facilitates the transport of
exported products from production locations to ports and the imported products
from ports to local markets.
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5 Estimations Results
5.1 Which aspects of Trade Facilitation Do Affect Bilateral
Trade?
The results presented in table 8 show three regressions. The first one one is
the most disaggregated as it takes into account exporter’s and importer’s time and
documents for exports and for imports (so, we have eight variables). The first dis-
aggregated model is more adequate as it generates more precise results. The second
one disaggregates time into time for exportation and time for importation as well
as document into documents for exports and documents for imports. The third in-
corporates time and document as aggregated variables. The analysis will be divided
into two parts. The first one includes usual results in line with the abundant liter-
ature on gravity (same sign and almost similar coefficients values). The second one
will discuss Trade Facilitation results. It is noteworthy that sectoral dummies have
been added to the regressions in order to capture sectoral specific characteristics.
Regarding the first group of results, we find a coefficient equals to 0.78 for relative
production, a negative impact of distance (-0.7), a positive effect of contiguity, PTA,
colonial links, common colonizer and common languages (with coefficients equal to
1.9, 0.96, 0.53, 1.5 and 1.2 respectively). Tariffs have a significant negative impact
on relative imports (-0.21). This coefficient is very important as it represents the
substitution elasticity. This elasticity is crucial to our analysis as all the coefficients
of the Trade Facilitation variables result from the interaction between the Trade
Facilitation measure and the substitution elasticity. Interestingly, the constant is
very high. This coefficient gives the border effect and it is significantly high because
it reports the border effect among countries that do not belong to a PTA.
[Table 8 about here]
As for Trade Facilitation aspects, in the aggregated regressions, a landlocked ex-
porter or importer impedes trade (0.36 and 0.30 respectively), showing that ocean
transportation is significantly cheaper. However, when time and documents are dis-
aggregated (in column 3), being landlocked is found not to be significant neither
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for the importer nor for the exporter. These two results are interpreted as follows:
once we control efficiently for the impact of Trade Facilitation variables, the fact of
being landlocked becomes insignificant. Thus, a country may overcome the negative
impact induced by its landlocked situation by improving its infrastructure and its
Trade Facilitation aspects. One of the most important features of our regressions is
that the more we disaggregate our variables, the more we can figure out the most
relevant impediments to trade. Column 3 shows that, generally, time has a sig-
nificant and negative effect on trade. In contrast, Internet usage is found out to
have a positive effect on trade with a coefficient equal to 0.18. Column 2 exhibits a
more disaggregated version where time for import and document for export are the
real impediments to trade. Finally, column 3 presents the most detailed regression
where exporter’s and importer’s time for import remains the most significant barrier
to exchanged goods. It is quite clear that Internet usage is significant through all the
regressions, for the exporter as well as the importer. Hence, Trade Facilitation would
have an important contribution in increasing trade through computerized customs
authorities.
Obviously, Trade Facilitation aspects do not affect bilateral trade between devel-
oping countries and between developing and developed ones in the same way. The
following section presents to what extent Trade Facilitation aspects differ between
high- and low- income economies.
5.2 Trade Facilitation vs. Level of Development: What
Are the Differences Between Developed and Develop-
ing Countries?
In this section, the regression results show to what extent our findings are changed
by the trade partners level of development. Many studies underlined the fact that
developing countries would capture two thirds of the gains from a DDA agreement
on Trade Facilitation. In order to control for development level, four regressions are
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run: the first one between developing exporters3 and importers, the second regres-
sion between developing exporters and developed importers, the third one between
developed exporters and developing importers and the last one between developed
ones.
Table 9 shows the regression results. As mentioned above, the analysis will be
split in two parts. The first one is related to the impact of usual variables on trade
and the second one focuses on the impact of Trade Facilitation measures.
[Table 9 about here]
Regarding the usual variables: it is worth noting that distance has a higher
impact on trade between developing countries than between a developing and a
developed one. This can be explained by the fact that high income countries use
developed means of transportation which reduce the distance cost. Distance has the
least negative effect between developed economies. It is also found that tariffs have
a less significant negative impact between a high-income exporter and a low-income
importer country (0.19) than between two low-income countries (0.39). This variable
is not significant between two high-income countries. These results are intuitive for
many reasons. First of all, trade liberalization between developed economies low-
ered the tariff levels. Hence, they do not represent a serious impediment to trade
between them. However, it is not the case between developing countries who are
more concerned by tariffs than developed countries and whose tariffs level remain at
high levels for many products. A first glance to the data shows that the average tar-
iff for high developed economies is approximately 4.43%, while for developing ones
it is 15.27%. Similarly, common languages enhance trade more between developed
countries than between developed and developing ones or between developing ones
only. The common colonizer variable is more significant when the flow is between
two developing countries than between a developed and a developing country. Obvi-
ously, this is due to the fact that most developed countries were colonizers whereas
developing ones were colonies. It is noteworthy that PTA has a higher effect on
3Developed countries are defined as being high-income OECD and high-income non-OECD.
Developing countries are those belonging to one of the following categories: upper-middle income
countries, lower-middle income ones and low-income ones
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bilateral trade between two developing countries than between a developing and
a developed ones. This result may be explained by the fact that increasing trade
between developing countries needs many liberalization effort through a legal frame-
work organizing such a process. However, numerous political conflicts discourage
trade between them and reduce PTA effect.
As for Trade Facilitation measures, it is noticed that time severely impede
trade between developed and developing countries or between developing ones only.
It is found out that time for imports has a lower negative effect on flows between
two low income countries (0.07%) than between a low and a high income countries
(0.03%). This result proves how developing countries need to enhance their Trade
Facilitation aspects, especially imports time in order to increase trade not only
between them but also with developed economies. This result is robust in other
regressions as I found that the coefficients of Trade Facilitation features have higher
values when the trade flow is between a high-income and a low-income countries than
between two low-income countries. Moreover, documents requested to export hinder
trade by 30% between a developing exporter and a developed importer significantly
. The Internet widespread is more significant between developed countries than
between developing ones, pointing to the weakness of technology infrastructure in
these countries. It should be noted that one of the most important aspects of
Trade Facilitation for developing countries is infrastructure. This is due to the fact
that infrastructure is the major impediment to trade in developing countries, which
is not the case in developed ones. Hence, these countries should spend more on
infrastructure in order to have large paved roads, well-prepared ports and efficient
customs, which in turn will reduce number of days and documents requested to
export or to import.
5.3 Which products Are the Most Sensitive to Trade Facil-
itation Aspects?
As a matter of fact, not all products are impacted in the same way by Trade Fa-
cilitation. Many products are more sensitive to Trade Facilitation than others such
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as perishable goods (foods and agricultural goods), seasonal products (garments),
products with short market lifetime (high technology products) and intermediate
goods. Hence, table 10 and 11 show numerous regressions for many manufactur-
ing sectors4. One problem arises associated to the products coverage of the two
databases. Trade and Production covers the manufacturing sectors (300), while
Doing Business covers only some specific products 5. However, the regressions are
performed even for sectors that may not be compatible with the Doing Business
assumptions of traded products. Our intuition here is to use the Doing Business
variables as a proxy in order to evaluate the impact of time and document on the
traded products. Intuitively, we will see that for sectors compatible with the Doing
Business assumptions, time and document have a higher significant effect than for
ones not included in it.
[Table 10 and 11 about here]
Regarding the impact of time on different products, beverages and food are quite
sensitive to imports time. Undoubtedly, such perishable products need fast clear-
ance and quick delivery in order to use them before they perish. One of the most
interesting results regarding food, as well as textiles and wearing apparels is the one
associated with the impact of contiguity. It is evident that, as time matters for such
products, food and garments trade will increase if two countries share common bor-
ders. The reason is simple: the former will perish and the latter must be delivered
quickly to be used in the season where they have to be used not after. Moreover,
it is worth mentioning that import documents have a significant negative effect on
wearing apparels.
Nonetheless, our results show that many products are not sensitive to Trade Fa-
cilitation such as tobacco which is not affected neither by time, nor by documents,
nor by internet.
4For the list of sectors included in our analysis, see table 7 in appendix 3
5For more details about the products assumptions, see Appendix 1. It is noteworthy that our
results do not change even if we eliminate the products that are not compatible with Doing Business
assumptions, namely food and beverages.
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Last but not least, many high value-added products, e.g. transport equipment,
are found to be affected not only by imports time but also by exports and imports
documents. This result seems to be a bit paradoxical because, presumably, equip-
ments are not sensitive neither to time nor to documents. Moreover, they are neither
perishable, nor seasonal, nor with a short market lifetime. Nonetheless, they have
a crucial role in the production process as they are used to transfer intermediate
inputs, exported goods from production locations to ports and imported ones from
ports to markets. Finally, like transport equipments, electric machinery are im-
pacted by documents also for the same reason (which is the case for the output of
many high-value added or hard industries, such as: non ferrous metals, fabricated
metal products, machinery other than electric one and professional and scientific
equipments). Some of these sectors (which are either intermediate or high-value-
added products) need a lot of documents in order to guarantee their conformity to
the international norms of high-technology products. Moreover, those same sectors
are not affected by the use of the Internet.
In brief, it is quite clear that Trade Facilitation impact is higher for product
with higher value-added, for perishable, for seasonal and for intermediate goods.
Thus, it covers a quite important range of products. That is why it will generate
many gains through quicker (less time and documents) and more computerized (more
technology) trade.
5.4 Calculating Consistent Estimates for the Impact of Trade
Facilitation
The objective of this part is to calculate the precise estimates of Trade Facilitation
and distance coefficients as well as the elasticity of substitution. The elasticity of
substitution (σ) is obtained by adding one to the tariff coefficient (σ-1). To obtain
the distance elasticity (δ), the distance coefficient (δ(σ-1)) is divided by the tariff
one. Finally, regarding Trade Facilitation aspects, the Trade Facilitation coefficient
(µ(σ-1)) is divided by the tariff coefficient to acquire the µ which is the real impact
of Trade Facilitation aspects.
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[Table 12 about here]
Table 12 shows the results of this simple exercise for the main regressions 6. Our
elasticity of substitution has, on average a value equals to 1.25. The average value
for the distance elasticity is 2.5. The most interesting results are the one regarding
Trade Facilitation aspects. For instance, when the time coefficient is 0.00075, its µ
is 0.0023. Similarly, while the document for exports (time for imports) coefficient
is 0.21 (0.0008), its µ is 0.99 (0.0038). Finally, for internet, the OLS results yields
some 0.147, but its true µ is 0.45. Thus, it is quite obvious that the impact of Trade
Facilitation aspects is underestimated because their coefficients resulting from OLS
regressions are not deflated by the substitution elasticity term. By doing so, their
impact increase.
6 Robustness Check
6.1 With Different methods of estimation
Obviously, our variables of interest, namely time of imports and documents for
exports may suffer form an endogeneity problem. To eliminate such a problem,
instrumental variables method has been used. Regarding documents for exports,
which determines the impact of bureaucracy on trade, it has been instrumented by
the origin of the legal framework. The latter has been captured by a variable deter-
mining whether a country has been colonized by a French or an English colonizer.
The relationship is quite evident as the literature has proven that French-colonized
countries have a more complicated bureaucracy as they are based on the French civil
law. In contrast, English colonies that adopted the common law had a less compli-
cated regime. Column IV1 of table 13 shows that our results remain robust and
that documents for export are highly significant. As to time of imports, it has been
instrumented by the number of procedures requested to start a business. The former
and the latter are quite correlated as the latter shows to what extent the overall pro-
cedures in a country are complicated. This, in turn, affects the the time of delivery
and clearance of goods. Column IV2 shows that time of imports are significant and
6The results of this exercise for the other regressions are available upon request.
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have a higher negative impact then before. The third column shows the combination
of these two regressions, in other terms, instrumenting all the endogenous variables
with all the instruments. The most interesting result is that documents for exports
remain quite robust through the regressions showing that such documents are the
serious impediment that hinder trade between countries. That is why the initia-
tive of Trade Facilitation of making “paperless world” is crucial in order to simplify
procedures and reduce time of delivery and clearance of traded goods.
[Table 13 about here]
A second problem arises in gravity models which is the one regarding the log-
linearization of the gravitational equation. That is why Silva and Tenreyro (2005)
proposed the use of Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) technique as it
has two advantages: on the one hand, it provides consistent estimates in the presence
of heteroskedasticity, which distorts the interpretation of the model. On the other
hand, it deals with zeros values of the dependent variable. This section presents the
robustness check for our results by comparing OLS and Poisson results. Table 13 ex-
hibits the results of PPML for the sake of comparison with OLS results. Regarding
classical gravity variables, as OLS yields significantly larger effects for geographical
distance, PPML generates lower coefficients for this variable. More importantly, our
variables of interest, i.e. time, documents and internet, remain highly significant.
For instance, importer’s time for exports and for exports, exporter’s time for export,
as well as exporter’s number of documents required for imports. Moreover, in the
more aggregated version of Poisson regressions, documents for export remain highly
significant. However, some variables do not have the predicted sign when the Poisson
technique is used. These puzzling results are associated with the positive impact of
exporter’s time for import and of the importer’s documents for imports, the nega-
tive impact of Internet and the positive impact of time in the aggregated regression.
One of the reasons that explains the differences between OLS and Poisson results is
the fact that our dependent variable changes, i.e. in the poisson regressions, it is a
level-variable, meanwhile in the OLS ones it is a logarithmic one.
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To conclude, some of our results remain robust even when other techniques than
OLS are used, showing that Trade Facilitation aspects, especially time and document
hinder significantly bilateral trade.
6.2 With a Different Database for More Trade Facilitation
Aspects
This sections uses a different database to check the robustness of our model.
The objective of such analysis is two fold: on the one hand, take into account more
Trade Facilitation aspects and, on the other hand, identify to what extent the gravity
model is robust.
[Table 14 about here]
Table 14 presents the results using Institutional Profiles database. It is noticed
that first of all, the gravity model is robust. All classical variables are highly signifi-
cant and have the expected sign. Regarding Trade Facilitation aspects, information
and customs efficiency have a positive and significant effect on trade. On the other
hand, we find that transaction security reduces trade by 11% as predicted after the
9-11 events. Actually, developed countries fixed many constraints in order to secure
trade. These constraints reduced trade flows coming from developing countries as
shown in the regressions results. Fraud has a significant negative effect on trade.
The Internet widespread remains significant and boosts trade. A very important
result is the one regarding geographical variables (being landlocked or an island).
Once we control for many Trade Facilitation aspects, all these variables become non-
significant. Hence, more Trade Facilitation means overcoming trade barriers induced
by geographical impediments.
7 Conclusion
The present paper quantifies the impact of numerous Trade Facilitation aspects
on bilateral trade. This paper makes both theoretical and empirical contributions
to the study of the impact of Trade Facilitation aspects on bilateral trade. From
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a theoretical standpoint, a gravity model that includes in its derivation Trade Fa-
cilitation aspects has been developed. From an empirical standpoint, the impact of
Trade Facilitation variables on trade is assessed using several databases.
Our main findings are that transaction time for imports and number of documents
for exports decrease trade. Our sample is split into sub-samples in order to take into
account the impact of development level. It turns out that Trade Facilitation as-
pects have not the same impact on developed and developing countries. Clearly,
they would stimulate trade more between developed and developing countries than
between developing ones only. Finally, we conclude that some perishable (food and
beverages), seasonal (garments), intermediate and high-value added products are
sensitive to imports time. Hard industries are rather sensitive to export documents.
To check the robustness of our model, instrumental variables and Poisson techniques
have been used and it turns out that our results remain robust, especially for export
documents. Moreover, I rerun the regressions on different database, namely Institu-
tional Profiles in order to take into consideration many Trade Facilitation aspects.
From a policy implication point of view, this study gives quite important re-
sults. First, as more documents imply lengthier time, the initiative of a“paperless
world” is crucial for Trade Facilitation. Reducing or even eliminating documents
required to be replaced by electronic ones submitted through a single window would
highly simplify trade procedures, reduce time of inspection and delivery of imported
products. Recall that impediments induced by red tap costs do not have any rent
or revenue lost once they are dismantled. Thus, the welfare implications are quite
high as administrative costs are a real “deadweight loss”. Last, trimming down such
impediments would benefit to all trade partners, which is not the case of tariff elim-
ination.
The main shortcomings of this paper are strictly related to data issues. First,
regarding the infrastructure quality, many aspects must be taken into account such
as ports efficiency, paved roads, and so on, in order to have a more precise estimation
of their impact on trade flows. Furthermore, this model should be estimated using
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panel data when data availability allows this. Finally, ad valorem equivalents (AVE)
of time and documents should be estimated based on this gravity model to give an
idea about the extent to what those barriers impede trade. The latter could hence be
used in policy modeling, especially computable general equilibrium models. These
are very interesting areas subject to future research.
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Appendix 1: Data Description
This appendix presents the definition as well as the source of each variable used
in our database. Data have been collected from several sources. First, data on
bilateral trade as well as tariff and production come from CEPII’s 7 “Trade and
Production” database8. This database is constructed from several sources. First of
all, the original data (Alessandro Nicita and Marcelo Olarreaga, 2001) come from
the United Nations sources: COMTRADE and UNIDO. Despite a wide covering,
the World Bank files contains a lot of missing values for production figures in re-
cent years. This is the reason why, the Trade and Production database was largely
extended using more recent versions of the UNIDO CD-ROM together with OECD
STAN data for OECD members. Regarding trade data, the mirror inflows, available
in Alessandro Nicita and Marcelo Olarreaga (2001), were used along with the CEPII
database on international trade (BACI)9, which is also based on COMTRADE data.
The data used is a cross section in 2004. The distance variable comes from the dis-
tance database developed by the CEPII. The methods used in this database allow to
generate many indicators on internal distance, weighted distance, etc. This allows
us to estimate the model derived in section 5.
Finally, as for the variables related to Trade Facilitation, we used two databases:
Doing Business10 developed by the World Bank:
• Definition: Doing Business compiles procedural requirements for exporting
and importing a standardized cargo of goods by ocean transport. Every of-
ficial procedure for exporting and importing the goods is recordedU˚from the
contractual agreement between the 2 parties to the delivery of goodsU˚along
with the time and cost necessary for completion. All documents required for
clearance of the goods across the border are also recorded. For exporting
7Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales. They are available on CEPII’s
website
8As the available data from “Trade and Production” end in 2004 and the available ones from
“Doing Business”begin in 2006, these two databases have been merged under the following assump-
tion: being institutional variables, Doing Business aspects would not vary much between 2004 and
2006 making them possible to be combine.
9BACI is the new CEPII world database for international trade analysis at the product-level.
10This part presents the scope and the description of Doing Business. It is available on
www.doingbusiness.org
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goods, procedures range from packing the goods at the factory to their de-
parture from the port of exit. For importing goods, procedures range from
the vesselSˇs arrival at the port of entry to the cargoSˇs delivery at the factory
warehouse. Payment is made by letter of credit.
• Assumptions: Local freight forwarders, shipping lines, customs brokers and
port officials provide information on required documents and cost as well as
the time to complete each procedure. To make the data comparable across
countries, several assumptions about the business and the traded goods are
used. Since 2007, assumptions were refined to adjust for particularities of
land-locked countries and reduce variations related to documentation involving
private parties. In the case of landlocked countries any port related data
is based on information provided by the relevant sea port country. Inland
transport costs are based on number of kilometers. The time to obtain a letter
of credit refers to a first time application and any documentation between the
shipper and trader is excluded.
Regarding the business, it must have 60 or more employees, be located in the
countrySˇs most populous city. The business must be also a private, limited
liability company. It does not operate within an export processing zone or
an industrial estate with special export or import privileges. Finally, it is
domestically owned with no foreign ownership. Exports more than 10% of its
sales.
As to traded products taken into account, they should travel in a dry-cargo,
20-foot, full container load. The product is not hazardous nor does it include
military items. It does not require refrigeration or any other special environ-
ment. Finally, it does not require any special phytosanitary or environmental
safety standards other than accepted international standards.
• Variables Definition: Regarding documents, Doing Business defines them be-
ing all documents required to export and import the goods are recorded. It
is assumed that the contract has already been agreed upon and signed by
both parties. Documents include bank documents, customs declaration and
clearance documents, port filing documents, import licenses and other official
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documents exchanged between the concerned parties. Documents filed simul-
taneously are considered different documents but with the same time frame
for completion. As to time, it is recorded in calendar days. The time calcu-
lation for a procedure starts from the moment it is initiated and runs until
it is completed. If a procedure can be accelerated for an additional cost, the
fastest legal procedure is chosen. It is assumed that neither the exporter nor
the importer wastes time and that each commits to completing each remain-
ing procedure without delay. Procedures that can be completed in parallel are
measured as simultaneous. The waiting time between procedures, for example,
during unloading of the cargo, is included in the measure.
Finally, the Internet variable comes from the World Development Indicators
database available on the World Bank web site. This variable determines the num-
ber of Internet users per 1000 people being the best proxy for technological intensity
and for the intensity of e-commerce.
The second database, Institutional Profiles (2001), that is used for robustness
check, is a survey conducted by researchers based at the French Ministry of the
Economy, Finance and Industry (MINEFI) and the French Development Agency
(AFD) based on a survey conducted by MINEFI and AFD agencies in the countries
covered (51 countries both developed and developing). Data were collected through
a questionnaire describing the institutional characteristics of these countries and was
split in 4 sections: section A was related to the institutional environment, section B
to the market for goods and services, section C concerned the financial system and
section D the labor market and social interactions. Out of the legion of indicators
included in the database, only 14 were chosen based on their appropriateness to
Trade Facilitation.
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Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the used variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Flow 34226.53 472471.7 0.0009 7.11E+07
Ln(Rel. Imp) -7.87549 4.076451 -25.0902 7.146209
Ln(Production) 0.117676 4.138838 -16.4876 16.48759
Ln(Distance) 3.703952 1.390011 -4.00679 8.205046
Ln(Tariff) 1.887526 1.237213 0 6.908755
Contibuity 0.026133 0.159532 0 1
Com. Lang 0.152688 0.359686 0 1
Colony 0.019127 0.136973 0 1
Com. Col. 0.081989 0.274348 0 1
PTA 0.022821 0.149333 0 1
Landlocked Exp. 0.17109 0.376588 0 1
Landlocked Imp. 0.181122 0.385119 0 1
Island Exp. 0.135962 0.342749 0 1
Island Imp. 0.146917 0.354023 0 1
Exporter Doc. For Export 7.020906 2.224858 3 14
Exporter Doc. For Import 8.841187 3.371443 1 19
Importer Doc for Export 7.012269 2.214629 3 14
Importer Doc for Import 8.800639 3.435382 1 19
Exporter Time for Export 26.14798 16.69472 5 102
Exporter Time for Import 30.8264 20.17957 3 104
Importer Time for Export 26.27936 16.88121 5 102
Importer Time for Import 30.87687 20.3216 3 104
Internet users per 1000 people (Imp) 1.912023 2.018309 0.007731 7.562283
Internet users per 1000 people (Exp) 1.932443 2.032466 0.007731 7.562283
Table 2: Correlation matrix among the used variables from Doing Business Database
Variables Doc. (exp.) Time (exp.) Doc. (imp.) Time (imp.)
Doc. (exp.) 1
Time (exp.) 0.6564 1
Doc. (imp.) 0.706 0.6381 1
Time (imp.) 0.6423 0.9387 0.671 1
Source: Constructed by the author from “Doing Business”, the World Bank, 2006.
Table 3: Time and Document for Developed and Developing countries
Variable Developing Developed
Exporter Doc for Exp. 6.96 7.16
Exporter Doc for Imp. 8.79 8.97
Importer Doc for Exp. 7.82 4.96
Importer Doc for Imp. 9.89 6.04
Exporter Time for Exp. 25.65 27.42
Exporter Time for Imp. 30.23 32.34
Importer Time for Exp. 32.00 11.80
Importer Time for Imp. 37.96 12.93
Source: Constructed by the author from “Doing
Business”, World Bank, 2006.
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Figure 1:
Document and Time for Export and Import
Document and Time
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Source: Doing Business, The World Bank.
Notes: (i.) Documents are defined as all documents required to export and import the
goods. It is assumed that the contract has already been agreed upon and signed by both
parties. Documents include all official documents exchanged between the concerned
parties. For more details, see appendix 1.
(ii.) Time is recorded in calendar days. The time calculation for a procedure starts from
the moment it is initiated and runs until it is completed. It is assumed that neither
the exporter nor the importer wastes time and that each commits to completing each
remaining procedure without delay. For more details, see appendix 1.
Table 4: Time and Document for Landlocked and Not landlocked countries
Landlocked Not Lanlocked
Variable Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Doc. for exp. 7.474 4 14 6.658 3 14
Time for exp. 36.366 6 89 21.829 5 102
Doc. for imp. 9.354 4 19 8.468 1 18
Time for imp. 43.548 6 104 26.095 3 101
Source: Constructed by the author from “Doing Business”, World Bank, 2006.
Appendix 3: List of countries and sectors in the
sample
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Table 5: List of countries by code iso-3
Country ISO 3 Country ISO 3 Country ISO 3 Country ISO 3
Afghanistan AFG East Timor TMP Latvia LVA Sao Tome and Principe STP
Albania ALB Ecuador ECU Lebanon LBN Saudi Arabia SAU
Algeria DZA Egypt EGY Lesotho LSO Senegal SEN
Angola AGO El Salvador SLV Lithuania LTU Serbia and Mont. YUG
Anti. & Barbuda ATG Luxembourg LUX Macedonia MKD Seychelles SYC
Argentina ARG Eritrea ERI Madagascar MDG Sierra Leone SLE
Armenia ARM Estonia EST Malawi MWI Singapore SGP
Australia AUS Ethiopia ETH Malaysia MYS Slovakia SVK
Austria AUT Fiji FJI Maldives MDV Slovenia SVN
Azerbaijan AZE Finland FIN Mali MLI Solomon Islands SLB
Bangladesh BGD France FRA Marshall Islands MHL South Africa ZAF
Belarus BLR Gabon GAB Mauritania MRT Spain ESP
Belgium BEL Gambia GMB Mauritius MUS Sri Lanka LKA
Belize BLZ Georgia GEO Mexico MEX St. Kitts & Nevis KNA
Benin BEN Germany DEU Micronesia FSM St. Lucia LCA
Bhutan BTN Ghana GHA Moldova, Rep.of MDA St. Vincent & Grenad. VCT
Bolivia BOL Greece GRC Mongolia MNG Sudan SDN
Bosnia & Herzeg. BIH Grenada GRD Montenegro MNT Suriname SUR
Botswana BWA Guatemala GTM Morocco MAR Swaziland SWZ
Brazil BRA Guinea GIN Mozambique MOZ Sweden SWE
Bulgaria BGR Guinea-Bissau GNB Namibia NAM Switzerland CHE
Burkina Faso BFA Guyana GUY Nepal NPL Syria SYR
Burundi BDI Haiti HTI Netherlands NLD Taiwan TWN
Cambodia KHM Honduras HND New Zealand NZL Tajikistan TJK
Cameroon CMR Hong Kong HKG Nicaragua NIC Tanzania TZA
Canada CAN Hungary HUN Niger NER Thailand THA
Cape Verde CPV Iceland ISL Nigeria NGA Togo TGO
Central Afri. Rep. CAF India IND Norway NOR Tonga TON
Chad TCD Indonesia IDN Oman OMN Trinidad & Tob. TTO
Chile CHL Iran IRN Pakistan PAK Tunisia TUN
China CHN Iraq IRQ Palau PLW Turkey TUR
Colombia COL Ireland IRL Palestine PAL Uganda UGA
Comoros COM Israel ISR Panama PAN Ukraine UKR
Congo (Dem. Rep.) ZAR Italy ITA Papua New Guinea PNG Emirates ARE
Congo, Rep. COG Jamaica JAM Paraguay PRY United Kingdom GBR
Costa Rica CRI Japan JPN Peru PER Uni. States of Amer. USA
Cote d’Ivoire CIV Jordan JOR Philippines PHL Uruguay URY
Croatia HRV Kazakstan KAZ Poland POL Uzbekistan UZB
Czech Rep. CZE Kenya KEN Portugal PRT Vanuatu VUT
Denmark DNK Kiribati KIR Puerto Rico PRI Venezuela VEN
Djibouti DJI Korea KOR Romania ROM Viet Nam VNM
Dominica DMA Kuwait KWT Russian Fed. RUS Yemen YEM
Dominican Rep. DOM Kyrgyzstan KGZ Rwanda RWA Zambia ZMB
Lao Peop. Dem. Rep. LAO Samoa WSM Zimbabwe ZWE
Source: Constructed by the author from Trade and Production database.
Table 6: Distribution of countries used in the sample by income level
Income level Frequency Percent in the sample Cumulative percent
High income: OECD 25 14.29 14.29
High income: nonOECD 12 6.86 21.14
Low income 50 28.57 49.71
Lower middle income 54 30.86 80.57
Upper middle income 34 19.43 100
Total 175 100
Source: Constructed by the author from the World Bank database.
Note: In this table, the adopted classification is the World Bank’s one
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Table 7: List of manufacturing sectors by code
Code Sector
300 Total Manufacturing
311 Food products
313 Beverages
314 Tobacco
321 Textiles
322 Wearing apparel
323 Leather products
324 Footwear
331 Wood products except furniture
332 Furniture except metal
341 Paper and products
342 Printing and publishing
351 Industrial chemicals
352 Other chemicals
353 Petroleum refineries
354 Misc. petrol./coal prod.
355 Rubber products
356 Plastic products
361 Pottery China earthenware
362 Glass and products
369 Other non-metal min. prod.
371 Iron and steel
372 Non-ferrous metals
381 Fabricated metal products
382 Machinery except electrical
383 Machinery electric
384 Transport equipment
385 Prof. and sci. equipment
390 Other manufactured products
Source: Constructed by the author from
Trade and Production database
Appendix 4: Regressions Results
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Table 8: Impact of Trade Facilitation variables on Trade
Ln(Rel. Imp) Ln(Rel. Imp) Ln(Rel. Imp)
Ln(Production) 0.781*** 0.776*** 0.727***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.020)
Ln(Distance) -0.735*** -0.700*** -0.655***
(0.044) (0.045) (0.050)
Ln(Tariff+1) -0.201*** -0.209*** -0.330***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.049)
PTA 0.636*** 0.965*** 0.943***
(0.13) (0.12) (0.14)
Contiguity 1.864*** 1.919*** 2.068***
(0.21) (0.21) (0.26)
Common Lang. 1.276*** 1.238*** 1.088***
(0.24) (0.24) (0.27)
Colony 0.463** 0.532** 0.750***
(0.22) (0.21) (0.24)
Com Col. 1.821*** 1.514*** 1.208***
(0.16) (0.15) (0.36)
Landlocked Exp. -0.0858 -0.374*** -0.356**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.15)
Landlocked Imp. -0.0825 -0.340*** -0.301**
(0.12) (0.11) (0.13)
Island Exp. -0.0354 -0.291* -0.387**
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Island imp. 0.813*** 0.683*** 1.131***
(0.20) (0.20) (0.23)
Exporter’s Time for Exp. 0.0286***
(0.0099)
Exporter’s Time for Imp. -0.0690***
(0.011)
Importer’s Time for Exp. 0.0207***
(0.0079)
Importer’s Time for Imp. -0.0505***
(0.0090)
Exporter’s Doc for Exp. 0.0943*
(0.049)
Exporter’s Doc for Imp. 0.0842***
(0.022)
Importer’s Doc for Exp. 0.0451
(0.041)
Importer’s Doc for Imp 0.0144
(0.024)
Internet users (Exporter) 0.0682* 0.143***
(0.035) (0.031)
Intenet users (Importer) 0.168*** 0.246***
(0.035) (0.031)
Export Time 0.000806***
(0.00023)
Import Time -0.000611***
(0.00023)
Import Doc. 0.0318
(0.033)
Export Doc. -0.208***
(0.061)
Time -0.000752***
(0.00023)
Document -0.0812
(0.058)
Internet 0.147***
(0.040)
Constant -4.423*** -4.138*** -6.307***
(0.45) (0.47) (0.54)
Sector dummies YES YES YES
Observations 28512 28512 24480
R-squared 0.63 0.62 0.58
Notes: (i.)Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii.) ***, ** and * represent respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels.
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Table 9: Impact of Trade Facilitation variables on Bilateral Trade: controlling for
income level
COEFFICIENT Low+Low Low+High High+Low High+High
Ln(Rel. Imp) Ln(Rel. Imp) Ln(Rel. Imp) Ln(Rel. Imp)
Ln(Production) 0.885*** 0.844*** 0.688*** 0.649***
(0.028) (0.033) (0.028) (0.038)
Ln(Distance) -0.925*** -0.676*** -1.032*** -0.461***
(0.096) (0.085) (0.065) (0.085)
Ln(Tariff+1) -0.391*** -0.157** -0.198*** -0.158
(0.067) (0.079) (0.075) (0.11)
PTA 1.704*** 1.226*** 0.753*** 0.965***
(0.35) (0.33) (0.24) (0.25)
Contiguity 1.616*** 1.782** 1.365** 1.376**
(0.23) (0.71) (0.63) (0.60)
Common Lang. 0.861*** 0.764 1.269** 1.242***
(0.28) (0.80) (0.51) (0.25)
Colony 0.613* 0.473 0.505 0.152
(0.32) (0.75) (0.44) (0.23)
Com Col. 1.355*** 1.172** 1.173*** 2.127***
(0.19) (0.46) (0.32) (0.46)
Landlocked Exp. -0.199 -0.600** -0.215 0.626**
(0.21) (0.23) (0.19) (0.25)
Landlocked Imp. -0.274 -0.0698 -0.497*** 0.367
(0.23) (0.20) (0.17) (0.38)
Island Exp. 0 0 -0.0835 -0.395
(0) (0) (0.18) (0.25)
Island imp. 0 0.888*** 0 0.453*
(0) (0.28) (0) (0.25)
Export Time 0.000587** 0.00277*** 0.000149 -0.00391
(0.00026) (0.00064) (0.00059) (0.0044)
Import Time -0.000718** -0.00310*** -0.000275 -0.00160
(0.00028) (0.00066) (0.00056) (0.0041)
Import Doc. -0.0719 0.119* 0.0536 -0.400***
(0.061) (0.064) (0.047) (0.11)
Export Doc. 0.0659 -0.301** -0.0232 1.952***
(0.11) (0.13) (0.090) (0.36)
Internet users (Exporter) -0.272** -0.111 0.134** 0.439***
(0.11) (0.12) (0.060) (0.11)
Intenet users (Importer) 0.263** -0.0382 0.613*** 0.450***
(0.10) (0.087) (0.090) (0.10)
Constant -5.986*** -5.496*** -4.955*** -13.34***
(0.90) (0.96) (0.76) (2.01)
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations 5561 7484 9701 5766
R-squared 0.61 0.57 0.60 0.58
Notes: (i.) Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii.) ***, ** and * represent respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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Table 12: Calculating consistent values for Trade Facilitation coefficients
OLSmi OLSagg
Distance coeff. 0.7 0.655
Tariff coeff. 0.209 0.33
Time - 0.000752
Document - 0.0812
Time imp. 0.00081 -
Doc exp. 0.208 -
Internet exp. 0.143 -
Internet imp. 0.246 -
Internet - 0.147
σ 1.209 1.33
δ 3.3492823 1.98484848
µtime - 0.00227879
µdoc 0.24606061
µtime,imp. 0.0038756 -
µdoc,exp. 0.99521531 -
µinternet,exp 0.68421053 -
µinternet,imp 1.17703349 -
µinternet - 0.445454545
Notes: Constructed by the author from
the regressions results
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Table 13: Robustness check (1): Comparing Poisson and OLS results
IV 1 IV 2 IV 3 PPML 1 PPML 2 PPML 3
Ln(Rel. Imp.) Ln(Rel. Imp.) Ln(Rel. Imp.) Rel. Imp. Rel. Imp. Rel. Imp.
Ln(Production) 0.762*** 0.782*** 0.778*** 0.743*** 0.712*** 0.646***
(0.0062) (0.0095) (0.0066) (0.0077) (0.0071) (0.0068)
Ln(Distance) -0.618*** -0.660*** -0.708*** -0.839*** -0.821*** -0.717***
(0.025) (0.034) (0.026) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
Ln(Tariff+1) -0.310*** 0.461 -0.365*** -0.317*** -0.273*** -0.290***
(0.030) (0.35) (0.054) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Contiguity 1.782*** 3.437*** 1.639*** 0.907*** 0.895*** 1.094***
(0.089) (0.77) (0.14) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044)
Common Lang. 1.266*** 3.739*** 0.704*** -0.679*** -0.928*** -1.046***
(0.072) (1.29) (0.22) (0.071) (0.069) (0.071)
Colony 0.593*** -1.309 0.874*** 0.822*** 0.931*** 1.015***
(0.075) (0.93) (0.16) (0.056) (0.049) (0.049)
Com Col. 1.312*** 1.761*** 1.447*** 1.308*** 1.146*** 1.428***
(0.095) (0.20) (0.096) (0.066) (0.062) (0.067)
PTA 0.725*** 0.633*** 0.969*** -0.418*** -0.242** 0.0925
(0.11) (0.22) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Landlocked Exp. -0.219*** -0.897*** -0.217*** -0.606*** -0.822*** -0.687***
(0.062) (0.30) (0.065) (0.070) (0.072) (0.076)
Landlocked Imp. -0.0888 -1.463** 0.0326 0.629*** 0.194*** -0.0554
(0.078) (0.64) (0.11) (0.045) (0.040) (0.039)
Island Exp. -0.219*** -0.0965 -0.299*** -0.277*** -0.232*** -0.299***
(0.055) (0.13) (0.059) (0.056) (0.053) (0.055)
Island imp. 0.661*** 1.266*** 0.590*** 1.374*** 0.737*** 1.350***
(0.056) (0.30) (0.071) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Internet users (Exporter) 0.0583** -0.688 0.332*** -0.0497*** -0.0849***
(0.023) (0.43) (0.081) (0.015) (0.011)
Intenet users (Importer) 0.0947** -0.304 0.363*** 0.205*** 0.285***
(0.039) (0.29) (0.069) (0.017) (0.015)
Export Time 0.000823*** 0.0220** -0.00396** 0.00000425
(0.000089) (0.011) (0.0018) (0.000067)
Import Time 0.000186 -0.0256** 0.00484** 0.000686***
(0.00022) (0.013) (0.0020) (0.000069)
Import Doc. 0.262*** 0.154** 0.0141 -0.0653***
(0.059) (0.066) (0.055) (0.011)
Export Doc. -1.209*** 0.823 -0.409** -0.314***
(0.25) (0.51) (0.20) (0.025)
Exporter’s Time for Exp. -0.0169***
(0.0045)
Exporter’s Time for Imp. 0.0486***
(0.0048)
Importer’s Time for Exp. -0.0208***
(0.0029)
Importer’s Time for Imp. -0.00780**
(0.0039)
Exporter’s Doc for Exp. -0.0282
(0.030)
Exporter’s Doc for Imp. -0.0751***
(0.0096)
Importer’s Doc for Exp. -0.00767
(0.016)
Importer’s Doc for Imp 0.0660***
(0.0075)
Time 0.000599***
(0.000046)
Document -0.321***
(0.016)
Internet -0.104***
(0.012)
Constant -2.375** -7.906*** -6.696*** -3.169*** 0.212 -0.956**
(1.12) (0.57) (0.98) (0.39) (0.24) (0.37)
Sector dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 28512 28067 28067 28512 28512 24480
R-squared 0.59 0.60 0.57 . . .
Notes: (i.)Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii.) ***, ** and * represent respectively statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels.
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Table 14: Robustness check (2): using Institutional Profiles database
Ln(Rel. Imp.)
Ln(Production) 0.822***
(0.012)
Ln(Distance) -0.788***
(0.031)
Ln(Tariff+1) -0.214***
(0.032)
PTA 0.400*
(0.21)
Contiguity 2.000***
(0.14)
Common Lang. 2.559***
(0.11)
Colony -0.221**
(0.1)
Com Col. 0.197
(0.22)
Landlocked Exp. -0.733***
(0.16)
Landlocked Imp. 0.0338
(0.17)
Island Exp. 0.0478
(0.11)
Island imp. 1.535***
(0.15)
Harmoni 0.0214
(0.022)
Info 0.128***
(0.012)
Cust. Effi. 0.0551***
(0.018)
Trans. Secu. -0.104***
(0.0088)
Fraud -0.0749***
(0.017)
Internet 0.00000830***
(6.2E-07)
Constant -4.826***
(0.17)
Observations 7746
R-squared 0.47
Notes: (i.) Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
(ii.) ***, ** and * represent respectively
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels.
41
